Frontiers - September/October 2018
Cognition: Yamaguchi, M., Clarke, E. L., & Egan, D. L. (2018). Is Your Color My Color? Dividing the Labor of the Stroop Task Between Co-actors. Frontiers in Psychology, 9'', 1407. Pairs were given a Stroop task in which each person was assigned a target color. The purpose of this study was to see if actors would integrate their partner’s task color and therefore show a Stroop effect for the color they aren’t assigned (monitor their partner’s actions and thus increasing their workload), or divide the labor and show a smaller/no Stroop effect for their partner’s assigned color (be able to focus their attention to only their color and reduce the workload). In the first experiment, there was larger Stroop effect in the joint than in the individual task, and a larger Stroop effect for non-target and partner’s colors in the joint task, but the differences were not significant (when looking at reaction time). The reason for the larger Stroop in the joint task is likely due to the requirement of additional withholding responses (do not respond to partner’s colors or the nontarget colors). Experiment 2 eliminated any non-target colors that weren’t assigned to either actor. As far as reaction time, there was still no difference between the actor’s own colors and partner’s colors. When looking at percentage error, there was a larger Stroop effect for own target than partner’s target colors, consistent with a division of labor. However, with the inconsistencies between reaction time and percentage error data the authors were hesitant to conclude a division of labor strategy and discuss the possibility of different processes that give rise to Stroop effects as an explanation for these inconsistencies. Constable, M. D., Pratt, J., & Welsh, T. N. (2018). “Two Minds Don’t Blink Alike”: The Attentional Blink Does Not Occur in a Joint Context. ''Frontiers in Psychology, 9'', 1714. In another task that was conducted in individual and joint conditions, the researchers were asking whether a joint attentional blink would occur if partners were monitoring each other responses/goals. In individual conditions, participants had to identify both T1 and T2, whereas in the joint task each participant only had to respond to either T1 OR T2. In the second experiment the participants were instructed to monitor their partner’s responses and were given global feedback on whether they as a pair were correct or incorrect. However, there was only attentional blink observed for the individual conditions across both experiments. Authors suggest that participants likely did co-represent/simulate partner’s task, but posit that 1) co-representation and attentional blink are results of different processes, 2) lack of conceptual overlap between the different tasks of the two partners, and 3) the social nature of the joint task diffusing attentional state as reasons for why there was no joint attentional blink observed. Lewis, M. B., & Hills, P. J. (2018). Perceived Race Affects Configural Processing but Not Holistic Processing in the Composite-Face Task. ''Frontiers in Psychology, 9'', 1456. This one might interest me more than others, but here they were looking at whether own-race bias operates on only configural processing or holistic processing as well. The composite face effect is commonly used for assessing holistic face processing – as it is easier for us to match identical top-halves of faces when they are misaligned from bottom halves than when they are aligned. In this study, experiment 1 found this effect for both face races (racially Black or White). For aligned faces, participants performed better in the congruent than incongruent condition (either the eye or mouth position shifted). Further, there was a race-by-congruence interaction, suggesting that race could have an effect on holistic/configural processing. Experiment 2 shifted attention to the bottom halves of faces. Typically, the top half is where we naturally attend to and focus on, so by shifting towards discrimination on the bottom half, the authors hypothesized that this would reduce the race-by-congruence interaction because both races will now be processed atypically. There was still a composite effect regardless of race (congruence-by-alignment interaction) but no race-by-congruence interaction. Overall, these results suggest that the composite effect is not affected by race, whereas the effect of congruence on aligned trials is affected by race. A possible reason for this is stronger configural processing for own-race than other-race faces. Therefore, the own-race bias could operate more on configural than holistic processing. Wang, Q., Liu, M., Shi, W., & Kang, J. (2018). Mechanism of the SNARC Effect in Numerical Magnitude, Time Sequence, and Spatial Sequence Tasks: Involvement of LTM and WM. ''Frontiers in Psychology, 9'', 1558. This study looks at the SNARC effect using a paradigm that simultaneously induces time and spatial sequences. In the first experiment, subjects where shown a sequence of numbers (with “5” always being in the middle of the sequence) and then asked to respond to a probe number as being presented “before” or “after” five. Subjects responded to smaller numbers faster with the left key and numbers presented “before” five were responded to faster with the left key and vice versa. In general, this experiment replicated the SNARC effect for numerical magnitude and serial order. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated whether SNARC would occur in the processing of numerical magnitude, time sequence, and spatial sequence simultaneously when participants were judging the probe number based on either time sequence or spatial sequence, respectively. Experiment 2 concluded that the SNARC could not simultaneously coexist amongst these three but did in magnitude and spatial sequence when making a the “before or after five” judgement. Similar results in Experiment 3. Curious to see if any of the SNARC experts have comments about this one. I got a little bit lost in this one. Korovkin, S., Vladimirov, I., Chistopolskaya, A., & Savinova, A. (2018). How Working Memory Provides Representational Change During Insight Problem Solving. ''Frontiers in Psychology, 9'', 1864. The dynamics of working memory load under different types of problem-solving tasks is assessed. Non-insight problems appear to be more demanding in terms of working memory load and relies more on the control system of working memory. Insight problem solving is more demanding of working memory storage systems. '''Developmental Psych: ' Bock, A. M., Cartwright, K. B., McKnight, P. E., Patterson, A. B., Shriver, A. G., Leaf, B. M., … Pasnak, R. (2018). Patterning, Reading, and Executive Functions. Frontiers in Psychology, 9'', 1802. Here is one from Frontiers in Developmental Psych that may interest some - looking at the role that executive functions have in patterning ability/pattern comprehension. Cognitive flexibility correlates with performance on object size patterns whereas working memory correlates with performance on symmetrical and growing number patterns. Tiego, J., Testa, R., Bellgrove, M. A., Pantelis, C., & Whittle, S. (2018). A Hierarchical Model of Inhibitory Control. ''Frontiers in Psychology, 9'', 1339. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01339 Finally, one that might interest a few of you is a modeling paper on inhibitory control. Response inhibition and attentional inhibition are often suggested as being closely related. This model controls for differences in WMC as a way to account for the overlap in response and attentional inhibition. The authors used measures of performance on vernal memory span, response inhibition (stop signal and go/no go and Simon), and attentional inhibition (Stroop, flanker, and shape matching) tasks to show that response and attentional inhibition factors were independent constructs after their shared statistic dependence on WMC was accounted for. '''Cognitive Science:' Ren, M., Zhong, B., Fan, W., Dai, H., Yang, B., Zhang, W., … Zhan, Y. (2018). The Influence of Self-Control and Social Status on Self-Deception. Frontiers in Psychology, 9'', 1256. Participants were given a questionnaire where they were either given answer hints or not. They predicted scores to be higher under the condition with hints than without. Next, individuals with high and low self-control traits and different perceptions of social status complete the questionnaires. Individuals with low self-control have greater differences in in predicted scores on a questionnaire when they are given hints than when they are not, but only for low social status perception. Therefore, low self-control individuals produced more self-deception, but high social status perception can restrict this influence. '''Comparative Psych:' Wang, M.-Y., Chittka, L., & Ings, T. C. (2018). Bumblebees Express Consistent, but Flexible, Speed-Accuracy Tactics Under Different Levels of Predation Threat. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1601. Looking at whether decision-speed or decision-accuracy is flexible in bumblebees under different levels of predation. The bees remained relatively consistent depending on whether they made faster or more accurate decisions regardless of predation level. However, there was some flexibility in these patterns. Bees became less accurate at color discrimination under predation. Predator detectability and level of risk associated with an incorrect response also influenced decision speed and accuracy.